

MOST IMPORTANT
ITEMS ARE CHECKED

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10 JULY 61

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DIGEST OF SELECTED DOCUMENTS ON BERLIN THROUGH 30 JUNE 1961 (FROM OWEN FILES)

1. 4 April 1959 paper, Berlin Contingency Planning. (Unidentified)

The tripartitely agreed paper on Berlin planning. You have seen in "blackbook"

2. August 1960, North Atlantic Nations Tasks for the 1960's (Robert Bowie). Chapter II NATO Defense. Deterrent less credible in 1960's.

"For the Europeans, tactical nuclear warfare would be tantamount to a general holocaust." Hence basic approach is (a) to enhance non-nuclear capability of Shield, (b) "enable NATO to mount nuclear retaliation against larger threats without a U.S. veto." (Conflict with April '61 Acheson NATO policy?) Recommends supplementary NATO strategic deterrent, veto-free, under control of SACEUR; initially an Interim Force relying on U.S.-manned Polaris, eventually a NATO Deterrent Force of missile submarines under common financing and ownership with mixed crews.

- ✓ 3. 12 August 1960, Memo to SecDef from JCS, Berlin Contingency Planning. This is the "Berlin Checklist." A detailed listing of scores of measures through six stages of tension, ranging from "East-West Tension Increased and/or Soviet Turn-Over Imminent: Purpose - To Demonstrate Determination" to "Decision Has Been Made to Adopt General War Measures."

4. 3 April 1961, Memo for the President, Subject: Berlin (Acheson.) Acheson's statement of the premises that he proposed for his study.. Hard-nosed analysis, of course, paralleling his paper as submitted in late June.

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✓ 5. April 1961, U.S. Policy Toward NATO (Acheson-based),

a) Political generalities.

b) Military.

(1) 1st priority in NATO programs for more likely contingencies
-- i.e., short of nuclear or massive non-nuclear.

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c) Economic. Nothing startling.

✓ 6. 28 April 61, Memo to SecDef from JCS. Subject: Berlin.

A 70-page document in response to a 17 April 61 Bundy request, which in turn seems to have derived from Acheson's 3 April 61 memo to the President stating the premises of the Berlin study he was about to undertake. Cover memo, signed by Adm. Burke, says that enclosed studies are hypothetical, have not been comprehensively coordinated, and only asks SecDef to "note" the studies before forwarding them to Bundy.

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(a) Appendix "A," though long-winded (pp 1-33), is excellent.

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[REDACTED] "Preparatory Actions" (pp 10-12) is especially worth reading, as as is "Possible Outcomes" (pp 24-27). A narrative "scenario" is attached as a tab (pp 28-33); this gets right down to one set of anticipated Formations, foundations, places of engagement, casualties, etc. Probably Army-written.

(b) Appendix "B," which is on the pessimistic side, outlines in detail the aircraft requirements, tonnage goals, weather problems, Soviet reactions, etc. connected with either a U.S. unilateral airlift or a "QBAL," (Quadripartite Berlin Airlift.) Probably Air Force-written.

7. 17 May 61 memo (in 2 copies), Berlin and Conventional Forces (unidentified.)

Excellent spelling-out of inconsistency between Administration's approach to Berlin contingency planning and 10 May DOD program on conventional forces.

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Concludes that Berlin decision is political, "not to be found in the fine print of the DOD submission."

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9. 1 June 61, a "flimsy" (probably bootlegged) Additional Observations and Information Concerning Berlin. Apparently comments by a Pentagon staff officer (probably Army officer on Joint Staff) after a recent trip to Europe. Contains bread-and-butter views on possible access military operations by Gen. Palmer (EUCOM), Gen. Watson (USCOB), and refers to meeting of Henry Kissinger with Creighton Abrams (CG of armored division.) Watson emphatic against dependent evacuation.

10. 21 June 61, Possible Arrangements with the Soviets on Berlin Under Varying Hypotheses as to the Effectiveness of the Western Deterrent (Martin Hillenbrand, State.) A "think paper" with no recommendations, but which points up ideas of a) Solution "C" with its matching declarations, b) Idea of Berlin (all of it) as a "guaranteed (by the UN) city," with perhaps UN headquarters transferred there.

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✓ 12. 26 June 61, JCS Memo for SecDef signed Lemnitzer, Subject: Berlin Contingency Planning. Memo responds to Bundy 13 June request to SecDef for answers to certain questions raised by Dean Acheson and takes into account views developed by JCS with Acheson and Norstad on 14 June 61. Paper breaks down into three parts:

(a) Military Measures World-wide (Appendix A)

Discusses increasingly grave preparatory measures and reproduces as Annex "C", the same table ("new checklist") as appeared with 21 June 61 JCS Memo to SecDef (see above.)

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13. 26 June 61 paper, A New Approach to the Issue of Berlin (by Policy Planning Staff of OASD (ISA).) Proposes a "limited war for limited objectives," so it is not very new at all, except perhaps to planners in OASD (ISA.)

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✓ 14. 27 June 61, msg Lemnitzer to Norstad (JCS 998202.) Refers to Norstad's ALO 565 (DA IN 125894.) Agrees present posture unacceptably rigid. Refers to JCS-SecDef meeting 26-27 June which agreed on need for alternatives short of use of nuclear weapons, and for substantial expansion present forces. JCS urgently studying "balanced partial mobilization" on guidelines of about 500,000 increase (deadline c. 5 July.)

✓ 15. 30 June 61, Memo Bundy to SecState, SecDef, SecTreas.

I. SecDef by 6 July submit prep meas to prepare for action on measures which cannot await NSC 13 July meeting. (Delay granted on this)

II. For 13 July NSC meeting:

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(2) SecDef also submit recommendations on perm increase US def estab "in the event Sov actions regarding Berlin appeared to foreshadow a long period of greatly heightened tensions." Also State-Treas-Commerce-CEA tasks of economic sanctions and domestic economy. Also State-CIA-USIA preparatory recommendations.

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III. For after 13 July meeting, SecState ~~recommended~~^{on} negotiating aspects and posture.

IV. SecState given responsibility of coordinating above studies and developing integrated timetable, the instrument being the ICG on Germany and Berlin.

I have prepared this digest from Mr Owen's working files on Berlin, and cannot therefore guarantee at this time that everything that has gone on around here is covered. If it seems somewhat "jumpy", the reason is probably that it has been somewhat "jumpy".

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